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1 Introduction
Discrimination in obtaining credit exists if people of different races or gender, controlling for
all other factors, have different access to credit by having different probability of obtaining
a loan or getting it at a different rate (Asiedu et al., 2012). Prior research has identified
limited access to financial capital as one of the major causes decreasing women’s ability
to launch and grow entrepreneurial firms (Coleman et al., 2018). Several papers focused
on whether discrimination is at work and to what extent (Brush et al., 2018). Looking,
in particular, at the gender dimension, the empirical literature shows that indeed women
receive less favourable treatment in the credit market (Chaudhuri et al., 2018).
Credit approval, however, is conditional on having asked for credit. Asking for credit is an
individual choice, a complex process that underlies several mechanisms at work leading to
the decision on whether to consider credit to fund an investment. Focusing on credit for
firms’ investment, rather than credit for consumption, the firm structure (e.g., business size,
age, and sector of activity) would undeniably play a key role in shaping funding channels for
an investment.
Would women differ in the way they fund an investment for their firms?
Female- and male-led enterprises show significant differences in the financial structure (see
Cesaroni (2010), for a survey, and more recently Stefani & Vacca (2013)). Evidence shows
that women-led firms rely less on external capital than personal one, and they tend to start
with relatively lower capital. This evidence is also shown in future investments (Carter &
Shaw (2006); Coleman & Robb (2009)).
Why should the capital structure of firms differ between genders?
Women experience more troubles in getting funded. Some sources of finance, such as venture
capital, fund very few women-led businesses (3% of total venture capitals are those funded
and led by women, as written in the Babcock report1). This low percentage could also be




(Aspray & Cohoon, 2007). All evidence leads to an ex-ante expectation of lower exposure
to external capital when the firm is led by a woman.
Italy is a good candidate to analyse this issue. Italy, together with Spain, shows a credit
demand gender gap of 10% in favour of men, which stands as the highest gap across OECD
countries (OECD data portal, 2017). Given the importance of credit to fund an investment,
we believe that access to credit and its determinant are a pivotal engine for growth of
female led firms. Hence, understanding credit demand drivers would be of high value added
especially in a country where women are less active in the credit market.
Figure 1: Credit Use Gender Gap
We investigate the drivers of credit demand and successfulness of credit applications by
using a unique firm-level dataset, the RIL, on a sample representative of Italian firms. The
main features of female firms, other than capital structure, are that they are on average
younger and smaller than male businesses, and more concentrated in the commercial and
service sectors. Controlling for the type of business led by women will purge the data from
the relationship between external finance and female-led firms.
Being able to draw on a survey that is representative of the whole sample of Italian firms,
excluding the agricultural sector, is a clear advantage. We claim, indeed, that our results
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can be generalised to the whole population of firms. We also break down the results between
types of firm ownership and dimension. As we want to highlight whether gender leadership
matters on credit decisions, we consider a female led firm if the decision-maker in the firm
is a woman (the questionnaire identifies the person who is responsible for the firm, whether
the CEO, manager, or owner). Our approach is similar in spirit to that of Ghignoni et al.
(2018) who, using the same dataset, identify whether more educated firm leaders are also
associated with fewer temporary jobs in the firm they lead.
In principle, one might argue that the gender of the decision-maker is a choice that can be
determined by similar (unobserved) factors as credit applications or credit approval chances
of the firm (or might even be affected by credit approval history). This is something we
cannot analyse with the data at hand. If it is indeed the case, we cannot make any causal
inference but only detect correlations.
On one hand, results show that credit is asked by women less often than by men. When
the responsible person of a firm is a woman, she asks less for credit, showing less propensity
to search for loan funding. On the other hand, results on being successful in obtaining credit
do not show evidence of gender bias. Evidence points to a lower demand of women-led
businesses rather than a lower probability of success in obtaining credit.
The rest of this paper is laid out as follows. In section 2, we revise the main contributions
in this area of empirical research. In section 3, we describe the data and how the sample is
built up, and we provide the main descriptive statistics. Section 4 illustrates our regression
results and the specification model, and section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Conceptual Framework and Literature Review
Small businesses led by women do not access credit on equal footing with those led by men.
There is relevant evidence pointing in this direction, even if the issue is still controversial.
The problem seems to emerge and has been explored in the literature at three different levels
(see Table 1).
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First level: Companies managed by women tend to apply less frequently for loans.
A few papers find that women-led SMEs tend to request fewer loans and finance their activity
to a greater extent with their own funds or trade credit. Coleman (2000) finds that women-
owned small businesses tend to rely less on external financing as a source of capital, despite
not being discriminated against when applying for loans. Ongena & Popov (2016) explore
the issue using a sample of European immigrants to the US. They find that female-owned
SMEs apply less frequently for loans and that the phenomenon is positively correlated to the
intensity of gender bias in the mother country of the immigrant. The gender bias measure
is built on the basis of the answers given by survey respondents to a particular question
focused on the role of women within the family.
A voice out of chorus is a paper by Stefani & Vacca (2013). These authors claim that the
different frequencies in loan applications between men-led and women-led SMEs disappears
when controlling more attentively for firm-specific features.
Second level: When applying for credit, SMEs managed by women face rejection more
frequently than male companies do.
The evidence is more controversial on this second issue. Asiedu et al. (2012) explore both
racial and gender discrimination in the access to credit, finding a higher denial rate for all
minorities compared to small businesses owned by white men. Bellucci et al. (2010) show
that female entrepreneurs face tighter credit availability and are more likely to pledge collat-
eral. Cesaroni et al. (2013) find that during the subprime financial crisis, women-run firms
suffered from a more pronounced contraction of credit availability, after controlling for all
the observable characteristics of the firms. However, they do not have data on loan applica-
tions to understand if the greater credit rationing was due to supply-driven discrimination,
demand-driven factors, or a combination of both.
On the contrary, other papers report no substantial difference in the availability of credit
for female businesses when controlling for the sector, the dimension, and other structural
features of the firm. Blanchflower et al. (2003), in a paper focused on the difficulties faced by
black minorities in accessing credit, find that other disadvantaged groups like women and
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other ethnic minorities do not encounter similar issues. Cavalluzzo & Cavalluzzo (1998) find
that women’s access to mortgage credit is comparable to that of white men, with even some
benefits to women located in concentrated markets. Stefani & Vacca (2013) confirm that
not only the application, but also the denial rate does not seem to differ between male- and
female-run small companies when taking all relevant factors into consideration. Ongena &
Popov (2016) also confirm that even if women apply less for loans, no significant difference
in the approval rate emerges.
Third level: When granted credit, women-led SMEs are charged a higher interest rate.
Muravyev et al. (2009) find evidence that female-run firms are less likely to obtain credit and
pay a higher interest rate when the loan application is approved. Alesina et al. (2013), using
a database of Italian companies, find evidence that micro-companies managed by women
pay more on overdraft facilities. The higher cost of credit still holds true when controlling
for the level of risk and for specific features of local credit markets. Other papers (see Table
1), on the contrary, maintain that the economic terms applied to credit are not correlated
to gender.
What may be the roots of the phenomena observed?
A first explanation could be that female-led companies face worst credit access conditions for
the very fact they are led by women. Due to cultural reasons and gender bias, bankers would
trust these companies less than those in which the reins are in the hands of men. A slightly
different, although related, explanation could be that women lack self-confidence. This, in
turn, would manifest through self-selection and opt-out from loan application processes. In
other words, women would not ask for loans because they are convinced they would be
denied if they did so, even when this is not really the case. A third explanation looks at risk
aversion, especially in financial-decision environments. Women could apply less for loans
because they are less bold and aggressive in their management behaviour. A rich stream
of literature investigates this perspective and finds that women tend to be more cautious
and defensive in their risk-taking strategies (Powell & Ansic (1997), Byrnes et al. (1999),
Barber & Odean (2001), Eckel & Grossman (2008), Croson & Gneezy (2009), Hsieh et al.
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(2017)). Interestingly, Bellucci et al. (2010) find that this gender difference emerges not only
when loan applicants are women, but also when loan officers are women: they tend be more
prudent and restrict credit availability to new, unestablished borrowers more than their male
counterparts. On the same line is the strong evidence found in microcredit, where women
are more trustworthy, more prudent, and less likely to make default because of unwise money
management.
Women exhibit a more prudent behavior not only in their financial decisions, but also in
their entrepreneurial intentions. Dawson & Henley (2015) addresses the question whether
this risk aversion attitude contributes to lower levels of female interest in business creation.
By using a questionnaire survey of students in several UK and European universities, they
find that start-up intention is lower among female students than male ones and this evidence
appears to be associated with a gender difference in risk attitude. In other words, women
show weaker entrepreneurial spirits together with lower levels of attitude to risk.
Along this line, Yacus et al. (2019) explores the key aspects of women entrepreneurship
and their ability to achieve high growth. When they look at the relationship between business
growth and women approaches in financing their businesses, they find that women running
high-growth firms are more likely to use equity fundingwhether personal or business equity
rather than debt capital. Clearly women behaviors are conditioned by the surrounding
environment. (McGowan et al., 2015) state that women ambitions to develop a business as
well as their propensity for entrepreneurial leadership can be significantly affected by their
social and human capital, namely their business and personal network combined with their
socio-demographic characteristics, skills and knowledge. Young women face a “double bind
of discrimination, being perceived not gender appropriate, not properly trained, and not
sufficiently experienced to launch a career as a business owner.
Finally, to answer our research question, the explanation could lie in the prevalent features
of female-run companies. The need for bank financing and the riskiness of the companies
perceived by lenders could be related not to the gender of the manager or the owner but to
the financial features, size, and sector of the company.
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In particular, descriptive evidence shows that female-run companies tend to be smaller and
are concentrated in commercial and service sectors. We are able to control for these factors
in our analysis so that the effect of having a woman heading a firm is detected.
Our work focuses on the frequency of loan application by firms when the decision-maker
is a woman. Among the issues discussed above, this aspect is the least explored.
The novelty of our paper is the use of a dataset representative of the firm sample, rather
than having a subsample of firms. This sample allows us to better control for size effects
and check if the opt-out phenomenon is still discernible in large companies when the person
in charge for strategic decision-making is a woman.
We also check whether the fact that a company belongs to an international group makes
any difference. The effect may be controversial, and we do not have a clear expectation
on the matter. On one side, the exposure to an international environment could lower any
culturally inherited barrier and make the woman approach bank financing more easily. On
the other side, knowing that gender bias is higher in Southern Mediterranean countries, such
as Italy, could make female managers reluctant to approach the local banking system and
prefer intragroup financing in order to benefit from better financing conditions.
We control as well for other features of the firms managed by women that may encourage
or discourage the demand for loans by affecting the risk profile and the need for bank capital.
The list of variables used as regressors, and their explanation, is listed in Table 4.
Important aspects to consider in this regard are the age of the company, the sector, the
profitability, and the investments undertaken, especially for innovation in products and pro-
cesses.
We control for the features of the woman leading the company, looking in particular at edu-
cation level and age. We expect the culture-determined reluctance towards loan application
to be negatively correlated to education. As for the age, we expect younger women to ap-
proach bank financing more similarly to men. In particular, we verify the intensity of the
opt-out phenomenon by age bracket, and we explore the existence of a non-linear relation
by including a squared-age term in the regression.
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Finally, we include regional dummies to capture any local difference in credit offer, macroe-
conomic environment, and intensity of gender bias.
Table 1: Female-run SMEs and access to bank financing Literature review
Lower application rate? Higher denial rate? Higher interest rate?
Cavalluzzo & Cavalluzzo (1998) No No No
Coleman (2000) Yes No Yes
Blanchflower et al. (2003) n.a. No No
Alesina et al. (2013) n.a. n.a. Yes
Muravyev et al. (2009) n.a. Yes Yes
Bellucci et al. (2010) n.a. Yes No
Asiedu et al. (2012) n.a. Yes Yes
Cesaroni et al. (2013) n.a. Yes n.a.
Stefani & Vacca (2013) No No n.a.
Ongena & Popov (2016) Yes No No
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We run the empirical analysis drawing from the sample of the Employer and Employee
Survey (RIL) conducted by INAPP (previously ISFOL) in 2015. The RIL is a nationally
representative sample of over 24,000 partnership and limited companies operating in the
non-agricultural private sector in Italy.
The RIL contains a rich set of information about personnel organisation, industrial re-
lations, and other workplace characteristics. It also includes the demographics of the firm’s
decision-maker, such as the level of education, as well as age brackets and gender. For our
purpose, the RIL has the advantage of containing the characteristics of the responsible per-
son of the firm, as well as some investment channel strategy, such as having requested credit
to fund investments, the key variable of our analysis. With regard to the sample selection,
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we only consider ‘active’ firms, meaning that we exclude wound-up firms or bankrupt firms,
with a final sample of 29,789 observations.
As mentioned in the introduction, this dataset allows us to concentrate our attention
not only on small and medium firms but also on large ones, so it could be interesting to see
the distribution of firm size and also the age of the firms, highlighting (potential) gender
differences.
The firm size is measured in terms of employees to categorise enterprises; enterprises
qualify as micro, small, medium, and large as follows:
• A firm falls into the micro category if it employs fewer than 10 persons.
• A firm falls into the small category if it employs fewer than 50 persons.
• A firm falls into the medium-sized category if it employs fewer than 250 persons
• A firm falls into the large-sized category if it employs more than 250 persons
From Tables 2 and 3, we can notice that women are decision-makers above all in micro,
small, or medium firms and mainly in ‘young’ firms. In detail, among large firms, the
majority of these firms are led by men; along this line, the majority of ‘aged’ firms are led by
men (women’s share in leading firms reaches not even 1% of firms aged more than 50 years
of activity).
Table 2: Firm size differentiated by gender of decision-maker
Type of firm Man Led Firm Woman Led Firm Total
Micro Firm 12,467 2,710 15,177
Small Firm 8,123 1,133 9,256
Medium Firm 3,850 359 4,209
Large Firm 1,059 61 1,120
Total 25,499 4,263 29,762
Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics. Starting from the key variables on gender bias
and credit demand, 17 percent of the sample firms asked for credit in 2015, with quite a
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Table 3: Age categories of firms differentiated by gender of decision-maker
Age of firm Man Led Firm Woman Led Firm Total
Up to 25 years 13,538 2,556 16,094
Between 25-50 years 10,692 1,549 12,241
Between 50-75 years 1,036 136 1,172
Between 75-100 years 173 20 193
Between 100-125 years 47 2 49
More than 125 years 13 0 13
Total 25,499 4,263 29,762
successful acceptance rate equal to 87 percent. As long as the manager’s gender is concerned,
women run a small minority of firms, only 13 percent of the businesses in the sample.
Turning to the firm characteristics, such as size, sector of business, and geographical locations
in Italy, it is noteworthy that the northern part of the country is predominant.
In our sample, on average, the average number of employees is 70 units, but ranges from
0 to over 140,000, while firm revenue is around 37 million euros, but climbs to a maximum
of 191 trillion euros. Therefore, our analysis embraces all types of enterprises, spanning
from micro to large companies. Dimensions are obviously related to the firm age, which,
on average is 26 years old, suggesting that our sample reflects credit needs and attitudes of
more mature businesses.
Focusing on the organisation structure, we look at whether a company belongs to a group
or is independent. As expected, 85 percent of the sample is independent, while only 11
percent belongs to a national group and 3 percent to a foreign one. Regarding the sector,
constructions and commerce represents the larger sector - 13 percent of the firms - while all
other sectors have almost equal weight.
Moving to the main entrepreneurs’ characteristics, they can be summarized as follows.
The average age is quite mature: almost 30 percent of entrepreneurs in the sample are
more than 60 years old, while only 6 percent is less than 40. Therefore, more than half of
business managers are concentrated around middle age. Such age distribution is reflected
in the education level. Seven out of 10 entrepreneurs have at least a high school diploma,
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even if only three achieved a university degree or higher qualification. On the contrary,
less-educated managers - i.e., middle/elementary school level - represent 20 percent of the
sample.
Graphs 2 and 3 report information on credit demand and credit approval for men and
women. Graph 2 gives a picture of the relationship between credit attitude and gender. It
shows that female entrepreneurs tend to ask for credit much less than their male peers. The
younger the age of the firm, the weaker the demand for credit is and the larger the gap
between women and men is. However, after many years of experience, growing up a long
credit and business history (more than 70 years), this credit gender relationship reverses
its trend. Such evidence might suggest that women need time to become more confident,
overcome their fears, and believe to be creditworthy.
Graph 4 reports information on the age categories and gender of the main respondents of the
firms. Despite the fact that only 13 percent of the entrepreneurs in the sample are women, it
is interesting to notice that the percentage of male entrepreneurs increases as they get older,
while the percentage of female entrepreneurs decreases. Therefore, our picture shows that
our female subsample is proportionally younger than the male one.
4 Regression Results
4.1 Empirical Model and Robustness Checks
The empirical strategy focuses on the drivers that might affect credit demand and credit
approval; to do so, we have two different dependent variables: 1) credit demand for in-
vestment, expressed as a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if there has been a loan
application during the year 2015, and 0 otherwise, and 2) credit approval, a dummy variable
that assumes a value of 1 if credit demand for investment has been fully approved.
CreditDemandf = β0 + β1femalef + β2Xf + f
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CreditApprovalf = θ0 + θ1femalef + θ2Xf + µf
Where f stands for the firm identifier, and individual regressors such as female and education
relate to the person responsible for the firm (manager, owner, or CEO)2. The variable credit
is equal to one if the firm asked for credit to fund an investment. Whether the credit was
given (in full) was considered as credit success3.
The explanatory variables include all variables characterising the firm, as well as variables
characterising the decision-maker of the firm (as specified in the question described in the
introduction). Firstly, we use the age of the firm, which should capture a different ‘stability’
and degree of being renowned by the local community, including the financial sector. As
times goes by, firms normally expand their network such as chambers of commerce, trade
partners, financial intermediaries, therefore increasing their visibility and reputation. The
decision for credit is likely to be determined by how rooted the firm is in the local community.
Then, the size of the firm could play another important role, firstly as larger firms could be
better equipped to ask for credit and considered more solid and less risky in the financial
market.
Firm size could also interact with the features of the decision-maker. In small firms, the role
of the decision-maker is likely to be pivotal (as s/he is the only person to make decisions). On
the other side, in medium and larger firms we expect a more diluted impact of the individual
variables characterising the decision-maker. For this reason, we also include interaction terms
between the gender of the firm’s decision-maker and the firm size 4.
2 For each firm, it is asked who is the responsible person (i.e., who makes the strategic decisions). The
possible answers are: 1) the owner/the family owner or CEO, 2) manager chosen within the firm, or 3)
manager chosen outside the firm.
3 More in details, the questions exploited for our analysis are the following:
• In 2014, your firm made a request for credit for investment? (with a binary response Yes/No as
possible answer)
• What has been the outcome of the request of credit for investment? (in this case, the interviewed has
the possibility of answering “Fully approved”, “Partially approved” or “Not approved”)
4 We also run other specifications of our model without firms that have opted for layoffs (defined in Italy
as ‘Cassa Integrazione Guadagni’), reduction in terms of number of employees, etc. without affecting final
results.
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The same rationale applies when we check whether firms belong to a group, making
a distinction between national or foreign groups. As mentioned above, moving from an
individual dimension to a collective one can lighten the weight of individuals and smooth
potential cultural discrimination. At the same time, belonging to a group can offer sources
of funding alternative to the domestic bank credit.
The main issue we are concerned about in this work is the role played by the fact that
the person in charge for strategic decision-making is a woman. We also include the following
control variables that might be distinguished between structural features of the firm (e.g.,
number of employees, share of female employees, age of the company, profitability, belonging
to a national or international group, sector dummies, dummies for the legal status of the
firm) and characteristics mainly related to the main respondent of the firm (e.g., age and
education level); in Table 4, dependent and independent variables are described. Finally,
we include regional dummies to capture any local difference in credit offer, macroeconomic
environment, and intensity of gender bias.
In Table 6, we report results from Probit regression. We find significant evidence only
for credit demand (coefficient statistically significant at 1 percent level) but no significant
effect for credit approval; in particular, it appears that women-led firms have two percentage
points lower probability of asking for credit than men-led ones. It is interesting to notice that
it seems that younger decision-makers, those belonging to an age ranging between 15 and
39 years old, apply more compared to more experienced decision-makers; however, younger
individuals might have less chance of getting the loan application approved (six percentage
points lower probability).
This evidence suggests that the opt-out phenomenon is less intense in the younger
decision-maker bracket than in the over-50 one. Several explanations can be offered in
order to account for this different behaviour. More experienced decision makers might ap-
pear more credible by the financial institution. However, the higher denial rate associated
to younger applicants may reflect either a gender bias or a riskier profile, due to the young
age, of both the entrepreneur and the enterprise.
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As for education, we expect the culture-determined reluctance towards loan application to
be negatively correlated to education. However, education turns to be not significant in
determining neither credit demand nor credit approval.
Looking at the firm characteristics, credit demand and credit approval are significantly
conditioned by firms’ performances. Firms with positive and larger revenues have around
three percentage points higher probability of asking for credit and one per cent higher proba-
bility of being approved. Interestingly, being part of a foreign group, reduces by ten per cent
the probability of applying for a loan, saying that infra-group financing is preferable in order
to avoid credit rationing driven by cultural bias or higher interest rate conditions. We also
perform an Ordered Probit to control for partial versus full credit approval. Results do not
show significant evidence that female decision-makers are discriminated either in obtaining
partial credit or full credit5.
One of the possible concerns in our analysis is the selection issue. Obtaining credit is
subsequent to having asked for it, hence, the probability of succeeding in obtaining credit
has been estimated for the subsample of those firms that applied for a loan. The selection
of the sample is far from random, and this feature could affect final results.
Put differently, only good debtors ask for credit. To allow for the possibility that selection
issues affect the estimates, we also estimate our model using a Heckman model (the so-
called Heckman Probit, taking into account the dichotomous nature of the main dependent
variable). The Heckman model allows to consider the conditionality of credit approval, which
could be correlated with characteristics also determining credit demand. For this reason,
despite the non-linearity of the model does not require additional identification variables, we
want to use a measure of credit availability in general, which does not correlate with credit
approval but with credit demand only.
We use as an exclusion restriction variable a variable capturing the general availability of
credit, which we proxy with the number of branches. The branch density, an index reporting
5 We also consider the case of having as dependent variable a dummy variable taking value equal to one
for credit success when the credit has been either fully or partially approved. Also in this case, results stay
the same.
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the concentration of banks by regions6, is strongly significant in the selection equation (and
has no predictive power in the main equation).
Results, reported in Table 7, are similar to the results not correcting for selectivity and show
no evidence of selection at work. The correlation coefficient, ρ, is not significantly different
from zero.
As previously pointed out, firm size could also interact with the characteristics of the
decision-maker. The rationale is that the relationship between the main responsible person
and the credit approach in a firm could be diluted, thus making the association between the
credit decision and the responsible person less clear. Thus, in Table 8, we include as a control
interaction terms between the gender of the firm decision-maker and the firm size: even if
the ‘female’ effect does not point out any differences among firms’ sizes, it is interesting to
notice that the negative impact related to the gender of the decision-maker holds, and it
appears that medium firms apply more for credit (almost seven percentage points higher
probability than small firms) as well as large firms, which ask more for credit but less than
medium ones. Along this line, aiming at capturing any differences related to how rooted
the firm is in the local community, we exploit the age of the firm categorised in three main
classes7 interacting with the gender of the decision-maker.
Results are reported in Table 9: it appears that ‘young’ women-led firms demand for credit
less compared to the ones that are probably more well known by the local community. This
also supports the idea that women would tend to adopt more prudent and gradual business
strategy, increasing credit demand at a later stage of firms life cycle. Finally, focusing on
regional differences, from Table 10, it appears that women-led firms in Northern regions
demand more for credit compared to regions belonging to the center of Italy. Moreover,
firms in Southern regions seem to be less likely to apply for bank credit maybe opting for
other types of funding for investments.
6 To avoid problems of multicollinearity, we do not add regional dummies as controls, but we substitute
them with macro-area dummies (North, Centre, South).




Evidence drawn in this work helps shape the policies that support women in facilitating their
access to the credit market (Coleman et al., 2018). Our results show an asymmetry in the
gender dimension in the credit market. A gender bias is found only in demanding credit,
with women asking less for credit in their business, while we find no evidence on success rate
in getting funded.
These results hold after controlling for different structural features of the firm. A gender-
detrimental effect is found at a significant level only for credit demand and not for credit
being approved.
From a policy standpoint, this result is of clear relevance. Women lack policies supporting
them in approaching the credit market. Demanding less credit, women may risk slowing down
the development of the company and loose profitable business opportunities.
One reason for which women are more distant to financial markets could be that they are less
financial literate and therefore less inclined in searching for more funds outside self-financing.
Another plausible reason is the difficulty in finding collaterals or the higher price they have
to pay for that as suggested by Coleman (2000).
Further research is needed in this area to shape appropriate policies, which ultimately
will level the playing field. Facilitating the access to the credit market seems to be the more
promising policy to put into place. Once credit is demanded, the chances to get it do not
differ between the two genders.
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A Appendix A
A.1 Description of Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Table 4: Description of Variables
Name of the Variable Description of Variables
Credit Demand The firm asked for a loan to finance an investment?
Credit Approval The credit loan demand has been fully approved
Decision-maker characteristics
Owner The owner of the firm is the decision-maker
Manager outside the firm A manager outside the firm is the decision-maker
Manager inside the firm A manager inside the firm is the decision-maker
Female Gender of the decision-maker of the firm
15-39 ys Age of the decision-maker between 15-39 years
40-49 ys Age of the decision-maker between 40-49 years
50-59 ys Age of the decision-maker between 50-59 years
more than 60 ys Age of the decision-maker greater than 60 years
University or higher University (or higher) level of education of the decision-maker
High school High school level of education of the decision-maker
Middle/Elementary school Middle/Elementary school level of education of the decision-maker
Firm characteristics
Firm Age Age of the Firm
Employees Number of Employees
Female Employees Share of Female Employees
Revenues Amount of revenues
Revenues(log) Amount of revenues expressed in logarithmic form
North The firm is located in the North of Italy
21
Centre The firm is located in the Centre of Italy
South The firm is located in the South of Italy
Person/Family major share One person/One Family owns the major share of the firm
Cassa Integrazione The firm opts for layoffs
Reduction Employees The firm opts for a reduction of employees
National group The firm belongs to a national group
Foreign group The firm belongs to a foreign group
No group The firm does not belong to any group
22
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics
Mean SD Min Max N
Credit Demand+++ 0.17 0.38 0 1 20793
Credit Approval+++ 0.87 0.33 0 1 3568
Decision-maker characteristics+++
Female 0.13 0.34 0 1 20793
15-39 ys 0.06 0.24 0 1 20793
40-49 ys 0.25 0.44 0 1 20793
50-59 ys 0.36 0.48 0 1 20793
more than 60 ys 0.32 0.47 0 1 20793
University or higher 0.29 0.45 0 1 20793
High school 0.52 0.50 0 1 20793
Middle/Elementary school 0.19 0.39 0 1 20793
Owner 0.86 0.34 0 1 20793
Manager outside the firm 0.05 0.21 0 1 20793
Manager inside the firm 0.09 0.28 0 1 20793
Firm characteristics
Firm Age 26.68 14.98 0 153 20793
Employees 70.34 1052.17 1 144624 20793
Female Employees 0.36 0.32 0 1 20793
Revenues 3.71e+07 1.42e+09 1 1.91e+11 20793
Revenues(log) 14.48 2.05 0 26 20793
North+++ 0.53 0.50 0 1 20793
Centre+++ 0.21 0.41 0 1 20793
South+++ 0.26 0.44 0 1 20793
Person/Family major share+++ 0.46 0.50 0 1 20788
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Cassa Integrazione+++8 0.17 0.38 0 1 17168
Reduction Employees+++ 0.06 0.24 0 1 20793
Does the firm belong to a group?+++
National group 0.11 0.32 0 1 20793
Foreign group 0.03 0.18 0 1 20793
No group 0.85 0.35 0 1 20793
REGIONS+++
Piemonte 0.07 0.25 0 1 20793
Valle D’Aosta 0.02 0.13 0 1 20793
Lombardia 0.15 0.36 0 1 20793
Trentino Alto Adige 0.04 0.21 0 1 20793
Veneto 0.09 0.29 0 1 20793
Friuli Venezia Giulia 0.04 0.21 0 1 20793
Liguria 0.04 0.19 0 1 20793
Emilia Romagna 0.08 0.27 0 1 20793
Toscana 0.07 0.25 0 1 20793
Umbria 0.03 0.18 0 1 20793
Marche 0.05 0.21 0 1 20793
Lazio 0.06 0.24 0 1 20793
Abruzzo 0.03 0.18 0 1 20793
Molise 0.02 0.13 0 1 20793
Campania 0.05 0.21 0 1 20793
Puglia 0.04 0.20 0 1 20793
Basilicata 0.02 0.15 0 1 20793
Calabria 0.02 0.16 0 1 20793
Sicilia 0.04 0.19 0 1 20793
8 With this term, we mean layoffs.
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Sardegna 0.03 0.17 0 1 20793
SECTOR TYPE+++
Mining and Energy 0.04 0.21 0 1 20793
Food and Tobacco 0.06 0.24 0 1 20793
Textile, Wood and Publishing 0.07 0.26 0 1 20793
Chemical 0.09 0.29 0 1 20793
Mechanic 0.08 0.27 0 1 20793
Manufacturing 0.06 0.24 0 1 20793
Construction 0.13 0.33 0 1 20793
Commerce 0.13 0.34 0 1 20793
Transportation 0.05 0.23 0 1 20793
Hotels and Restaurants 0.05 0.23 0 1 20793
Information and Media 0.05 0.23 0 1 20793
Financial and Insurance Services 0.04 0.19 0 1 20793
Other Services to Companies 0.07 0.26 0 1 20793




Figure 2: Credit Demand
Figure 3: Credit Approval
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Figure 4: Age composition differentiated by gender
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B Appendix B - Regression Tables
Table 6: Credit Demand and Approval




15-39 ys 0.0487*** -0.0646**
(0.0131) (0.0288)
40-49 ys 0.0246*** -0.0023
(0.0074) (0.0153)
50-59 ys 0.0107* -0.0191
(0.0064) (0.0140)
University or higher -0.0054 0.0071
(0.0084) (0.0176)




Manager outside the firm -0.0091 -0.0742*
(0.0143) (0.0420)
Firm characteristics
Firm Age -0.0007* -0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0009)
Firm Age2 0.0082 0.0001
(0.0050) (0.0102)




Does the firm belong to a group?+++
National group 0.0173* 0.0037
(0.0090) (0.0167)
Foreign group -0.1002*** 0.0041
(0.0092) (0.0417)
N 20793 3557
Legal Status Dummies Yes Yes
Regional Dummies Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes
Probit estimation model. Marginal effects reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Baseline variables are given by:
male, age of decision-maker greater than 60 ys, middle school or lower educational level of decision-maker, whether the
decision-maker is a manager inside the firm, whether the firm does not belong to any group.
Molise and Valle d’Aosta represent the baseline regions for credit demand and credit approval models, respectively.
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
+++ Dummy variables.
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Table 7: Heckman Probit - Coefficients reported




15-39 ys -0.3396*** 0.1817***
(0.0929) (0.0475)
40-49 ys -0.0546 0.0964***
(0.0721) (0.0296)
50-59 ys -0.0996* 0.0426
(0.0564) (0.0266)
University or higher 0.0467 -0.0197
(0.0760) (0.0358)




Manager outside the firm -0.2613 -0.0382
(0.1647) (0.0633)
Firm characteristics
Firm Age 0.0006 -0.0031*
(0.0040) (0.0018)
Firm Age2 -0.0100 0.0336
(0.0441) (0.0209)










Does the firm belong to a group?+++
National group -0.0103 0.0713*
(0.0751) (0.0367)
Foreign group 0.3177 -0.5657***
(0.2369) (0.0801)
Legal Status Dummies Yes Yes






Coefficients reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Baseline variables are given by:
male, age of decision-maker greater than 60 ys, middle school or lower educational level of decision-maker, whether the
decision-maker is a manager inside the firm, south, whether the firm does not belong to any group.
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
+++ Dummy variables. 29
Table 8: Credit Demand and Approval by Firm Size




Medium Firm 0.0693*** -0.0176
(0.0098) (0.0166)
Large Firm 0.0505*** -0.0205
(0.0176) (0.0316)
Female*Medium Firm -0.0120 0.0486
(0.0206) (0.0306)
Female*Large Firm -0.0043 -0.0217
(0.0472) (0.1027)
15-39 ys 0.0491*** -0.0640**
(0.0132) (0.0287)
40-49 ys 0.0238*** -0.0022
(0.0074) (0.0152)
50-59 ys 0.0099 -0.0189
(0.0064) (0.0138)
University or higher -0.0060 0.0071
(0.0084) (0.0175)




Manager outside the firm -0.0089 -0.0730*
(0.0146) (0.0421)
Firm characteristics
Firm Age -0.0007* -0.0000
(0.0004) (0.0009)
Firm Age2 0.0079 0.0001
(0.0050) (0.0101)




Does the firm belong to a group?+++
National group 0.0112 0.0062
(0.0091) (0.0168)
Foreign group -0.1039*** 0.0076
(0.0094) (0.0403)
N 20793 3557
Legal Status Dummies Yes Yes
Regional Dummies Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes
Probit estimation model. Marginal effects reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Baseline variables are given by:
male, small firm, female*small firm, age of decision-maker greater than 60 ys, middle school or lower educational level of
decision-maker, whether the decision-maker is a manager inside the firm, whether the firm does not belong to any group.
Valle d’Aosta represents the baseline region for credit demand and credit approval models.
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
+++ Dummy variables.
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Table 9: Credit Demand and Approval by Firm Age




15-39 ys 0.0486*** -0.0627**
(0.0132) (0.0287)
40-49 ys 0.0246*** -0.0034
(0.0074) (0.0153)
50-59 ys 0.0108* -0.0208
(0.0064) (0.0139)
University or higher -0.0054 0.0078
(0.0084) (0.0174)




Manager outside the firm -0.0089 -0.0734*
(0.0146) (0.0421)
Firm characteristics
Firm Age below 15ys+++ -0.0013 0.0372
(0.0169) (0.0300)
Firm Age btw 15-30ys+++ 0.0028 0.0334*
(0.0100) (0.0198)
Female*Firm Age below 15ys+++ -0.0008 -0.0282
(0.0203) (0.0484)
Female*Firm Age btw 15-30ys+++ -0.0330** -0.0021
(0.0159) (0.0408)
Firm Age -0.0008 0.0015
(0.0008) (0.0017)
Firm Age2 0.0086 -0.0090
(0.0071) (0.0140)




Does the firm belong to a group?+++
National group 0.0173** 0.0028
(0.0092) (0.0167)
Foreign group -0.1001*** 0.0058
(0.0098) (0.0404)
N 20793 3557
Legal Status Dummies Yes Yes
Regional Dummies Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes
Probit estimation model. Marginal effects reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Baseline variables are given by:
male, age of decision-maker greater than 60 ys, middle school or lower educational level of decision-maker, whether the
decision-maker is a manager inside the firm, age of the firm above 30 ys, female*firm age above 30ys, whether the firm
does not belong to any group.
Valle d’Aosta and Molise represent the baseline regions for credit demand and credit approval models, respectively.
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
+++ Dummy variables. 31
Table 10: Credit Demand and Approval by Macro-Areas




15-39 ys 0.0480*** -0.0682**
(0.0132) (0.0288)
40-49 ys 0.0252*** -0.0007
(0.0074) (0.0153)
50-59 ys 0.0113* -0.0183
(0.0064) (0.0139)
University or higher -0.0068 0.0069
(0.0084) (0.0175)















Firm Age -0.0007 0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0009)
Firm Age2 0.0075 -0.0006
(0.0050) (0.0102)




Does the firm belong to a group?+++
National group 0.0187** 0.0043
(0.0093) (0.0166)
Foreign group -0.1015*** 0.0038
(0.0097) (0.0412)
N 20793 3557
Legal Status Dummies Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes
Probit estimation model. Marginal effects reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Baseline variables are given by:
male, age of decision-maker greater than 60 ys, middle school or lower educational level of decision-maker, whether the
decision-maker is a manager inside the firm, centre, female*centre, whether the firm does not belong to any group.
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
+++ Dummy variables.
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